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IN THE STATE COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

ROD BROWN,e¢al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.
DIONNE VAN ZYL and BRIDGET VAN ZYL,

Defendants.

)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 2020CV331854

)

)

)
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter comes before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Dionne
and Bridget van Zyl. Having considered the entire record, the court finds as follows:
Plaintiffs brought this action in the State Court of Fulton County on March 7, 2019, Case
No. 19EV001268. This case was transferred to the Metro Atlanta Business Case Division by
Order entered on January 17, 2020. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged
in a conspiracy and a racketeering enterprise, establishing in essence a “Ponzi” scheme in which
Plaintiffs unwittingly invested. Plaintiffs assert a numberofclaims includingfor violations of
Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 ef
seq., violations of Georgia’s Uniform Securities Act of 2008 (“Securities Act”), O.C.G.A. § 105-1 et seq., fraud, fraudulent inducement, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and conversion. On April 12, 2019,
Defendantsfiled their motion to dismiss, which Plaintiffs oppose.

notes:

The standard for granting a motion to dismissis a stringent one. As our Supreme Court
It is well established that: a motion to dismissfor failure to state a claim
upon whichrelief may be granted should notbe sustained unless (1) the
allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant
would not beentitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in
support thereof; and (2) the movantestablishes that the claimant could not
possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint

sufficient to warrant a grantof the relief sought... In deciding a motion to

dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who
filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings mustbe resolved in the
filing party’s favor.
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortg. Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73 (2008) (citations and punctuation omitted);
accord Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75 (2014). “In makingthis analysis, we view all of the

plaintiff's well-pleaded material allegations as true, and viewall denials by the defendant as

false, noting that we are underno obligation to adopta party’s legal conclusions based on these
facts.” Love v. Morehouse College, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 743, 743-44 (2007)(citations omitted).
“In deciding a motionto dismiss,... a complaintis not required to set forth a cause of action, but
needonly set forth a claim forrelief. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may
be introduced whichwill sustain a grantofrelief to the plaintiff, the complaintis sufficient.” Jd.
at 744(citations and punctuation omitted).
A. “Shotgun”pleading.
Defendants characterize Plaintiffs’ complaint as a “shotgun pleading.” As the Georgia
Court of Appeals has noted,
[t]he Eleventh Circuit has addressed shotgun pleadings on many

occasions, see Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated, 516 F3d

955, 979 n.54 (VI)(A) (11th Cir. 2008), and we find some guidancein the
decisionsof that court. Although the concept ofa shotgunpleading is not
one susceptible of a terse definition, the Eleventh Circuit has identified
several characteristics that typically mark such pleadings. A shotgun

complaint, for instance, often “contains several counts, each one

incorporating by reference the allegationsofits predecessors, leading to a
situation where most ofthe counts . . . containirrelevant factual
allegations and legal conclusions,” Strategic Income Fund v. Spear, Leeds

& Kellogg Corp., 305 F3d 1293, 1295 (II) (11th Cir. 2002), combines

“multiple claims togetherin one count,” Ledford y. Peeples, 568 F3d
1258, 1278 (ID(B)(1) (11th Cir. 2009), and buries material allegations
“beneath innumerable pages of ramblingirrelevancies.” Magluta v.

Samples, 256 F3d 1282, 1284 (IV) (11th Cir. 2001).

Bush v. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, 313 Ga. App. 84, 90-91 (2011); accord B.L.E.ex rel. Jefferson, 335

F. App’x 962, 963 (11th Cir. 2009); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518-19 (11th Cir.

1991) (“quintessential shotgun pleadings” contain “ramblingrecitations”). Such pleadings are
“framed in complete disregard ofthe principle that separate, discrete causes of action should be
plead[ed] in separate counts.” Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 905 (11th Cir.
1996); see also Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 Fed. Appx. 368, 371 (11th Cir.
2005) (“The failure to identify claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendantto frame a
responsive pleading constitutes a ‘shotgun pleading.’”).
Georgia has “abolished‘issue pleading,’ [and] substituted in lieu thereof‘notice
pleading,’ and directs that‘all pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice.’”
Sheppardv. Yara Eng’g Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 149 (1981); see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(f). Pursuant to
these principles,
[a] complaint must contain “a short and plain statementofthe claims
showingthat the pleaderis entitled to relief,” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(A),
and as wehave explained before, this short and plain statement must
include enough detail to afford the defendantfair notice of the nature of

the claim and a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading.... Each
avermentof a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct,” O.C.G.A. §
9-11-8(e)(1), and althoughalternative theories of a single claim can be
pled in single count, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(e)(2), distinct claims must be
pled in distinct counts, at least to the extent that “a separation facilitates
the clear presentation of the matters set forth.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-10(b)....
Most elements of most claims can be pledin general terms, so long as they
give fair notice of the nature of the claims to the defendant.
Bush, 313 Ga. App. at 89-90 (citations and punctuation omitted).
The court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint, which includes a detailed recitation of facts
pertinent to this case, specific allegations of wrongdoing, and causes of action separately and
clearly enumerated, cannot reasonably be construed as a shotgun pleading. Although at times
redundant, the complaint is neither prolix nor rambling. Thefactual allegations coherently relate
to, and provide the prima facie elements for, the causes ofaction pled by Plaintiffs. Taken as a
whole andin its specifics, the complaint gives fair notice to Defendantsofthe nature of
Plaintiffs’ claims comprising this suit.
Even if the court were to find Plaintiffs’ complaint to be a shotgunpleading,the court
would be compelled to deny Defendants’ motionto dismiss because, “as our Supreme Court has
instructed, whena plaintiff fails to conform to these [pleading] requirements, the proper remedy
is a more definite statement, not a dismissal of the complaint.” Bush, 313 Ga. App. at 90 (citing
Hall v. Churchwell’s, Inc., 243 Ga. 852, 853 (1979)). The court is disinclined to convert
Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for more definite statement. See O.C.G.A. § 9-1112(e); see also Moultrie v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 148 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1979)
(“[M]otions for more definite statement are not favored inasmuch as discovery procedures
should be used extensively to obtain such information. Unlessthe pleadings are so vague and
ambiguousthat the defendant could not frame the proper responsive pleadings thereto the motion
should not be granted.”(citations omitted)); Padgett v. Bryant, 121 Ga. App. 807, 812 (1970)
(“Motions for more definite statement ...are not to be used merely as a substitute for
discovery.”).
Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismisson this ground.
B. Fraud based claims.

Defendants arguethat Plaintiffs have failed to allege their fraud claims and fraud-based
RICO claims with the requisite particularity.
Thetort of fraud has five elements: a false representation by the
defendant, scienter, intention to inducethe plaintiff to act or refrain from

acting, justifiable reliance bytheplaintiff, and damageto theplaintiff.
0.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b) requiresthat all allegations of fraud must be made
with particularity and not averred generally. Notice pleadingis the rule in
Georgia, and under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b), allegations of fraud must be

pled with particularity. It is well settled that a general allegation of fraud
amounts to nothing — it is necessary that the complainant show, by
specifications, wherein the fraud consists. Issuable facts must be charged.
Dockens v. Runkle Consulting, Inc., 285 Ga. App. 896, 900 (2007)(citations and punctuation
omitted); accord Fairfax v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 312 Ga. App. 171, 172 (2011). “In all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstance constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b).

Plaintiffs allege that they invested and/or lent money to a numberof entities owned and
controlled by Defendants, knownas the “Doron Group.” Plaintiffs were induced into these
transactions by relying on material misrepresentations from Defendants aboutthe“profitability,
source of funds and/or revenue, financialstability, investment objectives, actual investments,
assets andliabilities, investment risk, market share, investment protections and guarantees” of

the Doron Group of companies. Specifically, the entities making up the Doran Group were not
legitimate business enterprises. Instead, they served as a mechanism by which Defendants
created and maintained a “Ponzi scheme,” whereby payments to earlier investors and lenders
were funded from later investors and lenders.
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants wrongfully paid themselves and other family
members unearned fees and excessive salaries. Additionally, Defendants fraudulently
transferred fundsto off-shore accounts in the Grand Caymansand Australia to make the money
inaccessible to investors for purposes of absconding with such monies.
“Although fraud may not generally be predicated on statements which are promissory in
nature as to future acts or events, it can be predicated on such representations wherethereis a
presentintention not to perform ora present knowledgethat the future event will not occur.”
Seligman v. Savannah Wholesale Co., 185 Ga. App. 250, 252 (1987)(citations omitted). In
addition, fraudulent inducements made to convincea party to enter into a contract may supply a
basis for a fraud claim. See, e.g., Golden Atlanta Site Dev., Inc. v. R. Nahai & Sons, Inc., 299
Ga. App. 654, 657 (2009) (“Willful misrepresentation of a material fact, made to induce another
to act, upon which such a personactsto his injury, will give him a rightof action.”).
The court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged their fraud, fraudulent inducement, and fraud-

based RICO claims withthe particularity required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b). Plaintiffs’ pleading
sets out “[t]he circumstancesconstituting the alleged fraud ... with sufficient definiteness to
advise [Defendants] of the claim which [they] must meet.” Gwinnett Prop. v. G+th Montage
Gmbh, 215 Ga. App. 889, 890 (1994). This is particularly so given the multiple entities and the
numerousinvestors alleged by Plaintiffs to have been implicated in Defendants’ purported
course of conduct and givenPlaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants actively concealed the
purported bad conduct giving rise to these claims.
Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motionto dismiss on this ground.

Cc. RICO.
Defendants contendthat Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead their RICO claims.
That Actprovidesthat “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, through pattern ofracketeering
activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including
money”and “for any person employedby or associated with any enterprise to conduct or
participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.”
O.C.G.A- § 16-14-4(a), (b).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently identified the various Doran Groupentities as an enterprise for
purposes of the RICOstatute. An “enterprise” “means any person,sole proprietorship,
partnership, corporation, business trust, union chartered under the lawsof this state, or other

legal entity; or any unchartered union,association, or group of individuals associated in fact
although nota legal entity; and it includesillicit as well as licit enterprises and governmentalas
well as other entities.” O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(3).
A “pattern of racketeering activity” means:
Engaging in at least twoacts of racketeering activity in furtherance of one
or moreincidents, schemes, or transactions that have the same or similar

intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents, providedat least one of such acts occurred after July 1,
1980, andthat the last of such acts occurred within four years, excluding
any periods of imprisonment, after the commissionofa prior act of
racketeering activity.
0.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4)(A). At minimum,Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants
engaged in a Ponzi schemeover the course of several years involving multiple investors.
“*Racketeering activity’ means to commit, to attempt to commit,orto solicit, coerce, or
intimidate another person to commit any crime which is chargeable by indictment under the laws
of this state” and which are enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A).
A “racketeering activity,” also knownas a “predicate act,” is the
commission of, the attempt to commit, or the solicitation or coercing of
another to commit, a “crime which is chargeable by indictment” under one
of forty-one categories of offenses. And a “pattern of racketeering
activity” meansthat there have beenat least two acts of racketeering
activity that are interrelated and that were done “in furtherance of one or
more incidents, schemes, or transactions.” Additionally, it is unlawful to

conspire to violate the substantive provisions of Georgia’s RICO Act.
Under Georgia law, a person may be foundliable for RICO conspiracy “if
they knowingly and willfully join a conspiracy whichitself contains a
commonplan or purpose to commit two or more predicate acts.”

Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 164-65 (2013) (citations omitted). As predicate acts,
Plaintiffs have alleged specific acts purportedly committed by Defendants that would,if proven,
constitute violations of Georgia’s Securities Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 (theft by taking), O.C.G.A.
§ 16-8-3 (theft by deception), and mail and wire fraud . Eachis a recognized predicate act upon
which a RICO claim maybe prosecuted. See O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A), (C).
The court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately pled their RICO claims, including the

nature of the purported enterprise, pattern of racketeering activity, predicate acts, proximate

cause, and injuries suffered by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’
motion to dismiss on this ground.
D. Securities Act claims.

Plaintiffs plead claims under the Securities Act. Plaintiffs assert that the membership
interests offered and sold by Defendantsconstitute securities subject to the Act. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defendants committed fraud in connection with the offer and sale of those securities.
See O.C.G.A. § 10-5-50. The Securities Act provides a private right of action. See O.C.G.A. § 105-58.

In moving to dismiss those claims, Defendantsraise issues similar to those they raise
with respect to Plaintiffs’ fraud and RICOclaims, principally that Plaintiffs have failed to allege
their claims with the requisite specificity. The court disagrees. In their complaint, Plaintiffs
identify “the membershipinterests offered and sold by Defendants, through the Doron Group
entities” as the securities underpinning their claims and specify the acts of fraud and deceit in which
they contend Defendants engaged.

Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.
E. Unjust enrichment and money had andreceived.
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment and money had and
received based on the purported existence of contractual relations amongsttheparties.
A claim of unjust enrichmentwill lie if there is no legal contract and the
party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party
contending an unjust enrichment whichthe benefited party equitably
ought to return or compensate for. The concept of unjust enrichment in
law is premised upontheprinciple that a party cannot induce, accept, or
encourage anotherto furnish or render something of value to such party
and avoid paymentfor the value received.
Jones v. White, 311 Ga. App. 822, 827-28 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord
Engram vy. Engram, 265 Ga. 804, 807 (1995).

Under the commonlaw doctrine of money had and received, recoveryis
authorized against one who holds unspecified sums of money of another

which he ought in equity and good conscience to refund. Suchaction is a
legal action based upon equitable principles for implied assumpsit as a
substitute for suit in equity.... An action for money had and received
sounds in assumpsit and growsoutof privity of contract, express or
implied; but absent an actual contractualrelationship, the law will imply a
quasi contractual relationship to support the action. The elements of such
action are: a person has received moneyoftheother that in equity and
good conscious he should not be permitted to keep; demand for repayment
has been made; and the demand wasrefused.

Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 359 (2001) (citations omitted); accord City of
Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 289 Ga. 323, 328 (2011). “Such a claim exists only wherethere is no

actual legal contract governing the issue.” Fernandez v. WebSingularity, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 11,
13-14 (2009)(citations and punctuation omitted).

While Plaintiffs have not purported to plead a claim for breach of contract, they do sue
upon loan and investmenttransactions which may havetheir genesis in contract. That is a matter
to be developed factually in the due courseofthis litigation. Nevertheless, “Georgialaw ...
permits a plaintiff to proceedtotrial on alternative theories of recovery.” Campbellv. Ailion,
338 Ga. App. 382, 388 (2016)(“If a factfinder concludes that [Defendantsare] liable on
[Plaintiffs’] breach of contract theory, the issue of [Defendants’] liability underthe alternative
theories of unjust enrichment and implied contract would become moot. Conversely, if the
[factfinder] concludes that [Defendants] did not breach any express contract, questionsof fact
would exist as to whether [Defendants] are liable under these [alternative] theories.” (citations
and punctuation omitted)).

Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.
F. Conversion.

Defendants moveto dismiss Plaintiffs’ conversion claim, arguing that the money
Plaintiffs purportedly paid to Defendants in the form of loan or investmenttransactions cannot
form the basis of a cognizable conversion claim.
Conversion constitutes an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
right of ownership overpersonal property belonging to another, in
hostility to his rights; an act of dominion overthe personal property of
another inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized appropriation. To
establish a prima facie case for conversion, the complaining party must
show(1) title to the property orthe right of possession, (2) actual
possession in the other party, (3) demand forreturn of the property, and
(4) refusal by the other party to return the property.
Bo Phillips Co., Inc. v. R. L. King Props., LLC, 336 Ga. App. 705, 707 (2016)(citations and
punctuation omitted). “Demandand refusal is necessary only when the defendant comes into
possessionof the property lawfully. What is meant by defendant coming /awfiully into

possession of the property is, where he findsit, and retainsit for the true owner, or where he
obtains the possession ofthe property, by the permission or consentofthe plaintiff.” Williams v.
Nat'l Auto Sales, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 283, 285 (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted). “Since
an action for conversion is a suit formoney damagesfor the personal property converted, then
such suit constitutes the election of money damagesrather than recoveryof the personal property
ina trover action.” Taylor, 250 Ga. App.at 358.
Tangible personalty or specific intangible property may be the subject for

an action for conversion, but as fungible intangible personal property,

money, generally, is not subject to a civil action for trover with anelection
for damagesfor its conversion. While moneyconstitutes personal
property, moneyis intangible personalty that is fungible, because it
belongs to a class of property which cannotbe differentiated by specific
identification unless there has been created a specific fund that has been
set aside from other money. Thus, there can be no conversionaction for
money damages for money, because generally, money is not subject to a
civil action for conversion.
Taylor, 250 Ga. App. at 358-59 (citations omitted); accord City ofAtlanta v. Hotels.com, L.P..,
332 Ga. App. 888, 891 (2015). Moreover, a “tort claim for conversion cannot be based on the
breach of a contractual duty alone.” ULQ, LLC vy. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 181 (2008).
However, “[t]here exists an exception for the conversion of money; such money must
comprise a specific, separate, identifiable fund to support an action for conversion... such as
insurance premiums earmarked for remittance to the insured.” Taylor, 250 Ga. App.at 359.
In Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, our Supreme Court held that
checks and other negotiable instruments can be the subject of a conversion
claim. In its holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[c]onversion of
checks is actionable because checks designate specific amounts ofmoney
for use for specific purposes.” [276 Ga. 817, 820 (2001).] The Supreme
Court further noted that “[c]onversion is also available for specific
amounts of money placed on deposit with a bank and for overdrafts
charged by a bank onexisting accounts.”... /d. at 821.... The Supreme
Court of Georgia recognized in 1896 that a plaintiff in a conversion action
wasno longer required to identify specific bills and coins because in these
busy days of commerce, few persons keep their money in bags.... In
2003, that same court recognized “that a plaintiff in a conversion action
does not needto identify the specific dollars and coins represented by the
face value of checks and other negotiable instruments.”... In this day and
age when funds are commonly transferred via wire and otherelectronic
means, weseeno logical reason fortreating specific and identifiable funds
that are transferred electronically ... differently from checks.
Trey Inman & Assocs., P.C. v. Bank ofAm., N.A., 306 Ga. App. 451, 458-59 (2010).

In their complaint, Plaintiffs generically allege that “Defendants have wrongly converted and
exercised dominion over Plaintiffs’ property in denial oftheir rights.” While Plaintiffs’ conversion
claim is vague andlackingin allegations of demandandrefusal, the court cannotfindat this juncture
that Plaintiffs could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint
sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.
Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motionto dismiss on this ground.
(NT
Dactdant Plaintithk
G. INON-NESIGENT Flamtiiis.

Defendantsassert that the claims of those Plaintiffs who reside in states other than
Georgia are due to be dismissed,citing the doctrine oflex Joci delicti. The court finds
Defendants’ argumentto be specious.
Defendants havecited no authority that would support the dismissal of claims based on
lex loci delicti or any other choice of law principle. That doctrine only concerns choice of law —
i.e., whichstate’s substantive law might apply to a particular claim. See, e.g., Bullard v. MRA
Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 750 (2013) (“[F]or over 100 years, the state of Georgia has followed
the doctrine of/ex /oci delicti in tort cases, pursuant to whicha tort action is governed by the
substantive law ofthe state where the tort was committed.”). The doctrine does not purport to
precludeaccess to the courts of Georgia by non-resident claimants or to preclude claims
governed bythe substantive lawsof otherstates.
Defendants confuse choice of law matters with venue and personaljurisdiction principles.

Under Georgia’s Constitution, venue generally lies in the county in which the defendantresides.

See Ga. Const. Art. VI, § IL, J VI (“All othercivil cases ... shall be tried in the county where the
defendantresides”); see also Richardson v. Gilbert, 319 Ga. App. 72, 74 (2012) (“A defendant
has the right to be tried in her county of residence.”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants reside in
Fulton County, that manyofthe entities controlled by Defendants are Georgia entities, and that
Defendants’ purported course of conduct underlying Plaintiffs’ claims took place in Georgia.
Defendants admit in their answer that venue andjurisdictionin this court are proper.
Further, Defendantsfail to cite any authority that a motionto dismiss is the appropriate
vehicle for addressing choice of law issues.
Therefore, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED,this 10" day of February, 2020.
/s/ Wesley B. Tailor
Wesley B.Tailor, Judge
State Court of Fulton County

